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“Corps à corps” 
Frantz Fanon’s Erotics of Liberation 
Matthieu Renault 
University of Paris VII Diderot and the University of Bologna 
In this short paper, I will endeavour to show that Frantz Fanon’s well-
known conception of struggles for national liberation is intimately linked to 
an erotics of liberation. This one takes its roots in a shift, or better a reversal, of 
theories of racism. As Etienne Balibar argues, “racism,” as a category, appears 
at mid 19th century, especially under the aegis of the UNESCO, as a break 
with the conceptions of “race,” considered to be a pure “myth” or 
“prejudice.”1 A better example of such an epistemological rupture is 
probably Sartre’s Antisemite and Jew and its motto: “the Jew is a man whom 
other men consider a Jew…it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew.”2 In other 
words, race is nothing but the product of racism. The biological arguments 
that underlie the theories of race are “false” arguments inasmuch as they 
depend on ideological and/or psychological premises.   
 Fanon no doubt takes part in this reversal: “what is called the black 
soul is often a construction by white folk”3; or again: “it is the colonist who 
fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject.”4 However, some of 
Fanon’s assumptions (especially in Black Skin, White Masks) reveal that he 
has suspicions about such a paradigm of racism, which is grounded, as 
Balibar reminds us, on the anthropological postulate of the indivisibility of 
the human species. Now, for Fanon, defending the idea of the “human 
dignity” of Black people, by asserting that “the Black man is a man like 
ourselves,” is certainly necessary, but it is definitely not enough. What is to 
be thought is the actual splitting of the “human community” between men 
and undermen, the human and the inhuman, a division that is the pure effect 
of colonization. Fanon produces a reversal of the reversal by strategically 
coming back to the concept of race. He gives rise to a performative use of race 
names in order to undo them, to deconstruct the grammar of races and, in his 
last writings, to subvert biological racism by developing a conception of the 
struggle for national liberation as struggle for life, a struggle that opposes two 
antagonist colonial “species.”  
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 This will be the end of Fanon’s intellectual journey, but I would like to 
stress here that Fanon’s return to race begins as a return to the body. Indeed, 
what Fanon unveils in the theories of racism is a certain denial of the body 
experience. To be sure, for Sartre and others, racism is not a pure 
mental/ideal phenomenon. It is an affective/passionate one. And Sartre 
recognizes that it can involve “bodily modifications” – for example disgust5. 
The problem for Fanon is precisely in this relation of “implication” insofar as 
it means that the body’s living experience is at the very most a mere effect, a 
by-product of racism, which is by definition non-corporeal. It is as if talking 
about the body while dealing with racism always threatened to reintroduce 
the banished concept of race. Now, consider Fanon’s audacious move. It 
consists in arguing that racism is immediately experienced at the level of the 
body, both for the racist and for the racialized man/woman. This is a 
dangerous move because it means occupying the enemy’s territory, taking 
the place of the theories of race. But this move must be done in order to 
understand the effects that racism makes on its victims; and the limits of 
Sartre’s conceptualization, according to Fanon, is precisely that it prevents 
us from understanding that the “Negro suffers in his body quite differently 
from the white man.”6 Fanon’s still “scandalous” argument is that there is a 
fundamental “physical duellum” between the white man and the black 
man… but this conflict is the conflict of racism itself, not that of races. 
 This return to the body can also be analyzed from the point of view of 
psychopathology. In the psychiatric and psychoanalytical literature of his 
time, Fanon encounters the figure of the Black man (next to the Jew, the 
Communist, the Freemason, etc.) as an object of fantasy/delirium and, 
especially, rape fantasies. The Black man is considered as a pure symbol of 
the white man/woman’s unconscious. And unlike the traditional 
psychoanalytical figures (the mother, the father, the maid, etc.) such an 
imaginary being does not refer to any being “in the flesh” in the sense that 
no concrete contact with a black man is needed for these fantasies to 
develop. Certainly, such a thesis is salutary inasmuch as it proves the black 
man innocent of all the accusations (especially of sexual aggression) he is 
charged with. Nonetheless, for Fanon, it is problematic precisely because it 
prevents us from understanding what it means to the black man to be a 
symbol for the white-other. It prevents from understanding that this process 
of symbolisation is followed by another process of incorporation insofar as the 
black man internalizes/introjects the racial symbolic, even while he 
struggles against it. The black body is a symbolic body, a body that at the 
same time is and overcomes the symbol. Fanon’s theoretical strategy comes 
under what I would like to call a revenge of the symbol. He gives rise to a 
sensual discourse and locates the body at the very core of the writing process. 
 Fanon’s attention to the body goes back to his PhD dissertation in 
psychiatry in which he embraces the conception (promoted by Henry Ey, 
Kurt Goldstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.) of psychic life as bodily 
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integration7. According to him, such a conception puts an end to any dualism 
of body and soul, inasmuch as the latter is nothing but the higher level of 
organization of the former. Now, for the Fanon of Black Skin, White Masks, 
thinking of the body of the (black) slave means thinking of the black man as 
slave of his body. Identifying with the white man, striving for building a white 
self, the (West Indian) black man splits himself from his (irreparably) black 
body and experiences it as a perpetual obstacle. The duality of body and 
soul is now understood as an effect of the politics of race – not anymore as a 
timeless truth. Moreover, such a splitting takes its roots in what Fanon, 
following Freud and Jung, considers to be the crucial law of the process of 
(European) civilization: the law of dissociation of the white man psyche, 
between intelligence and drives, morality and instincts. Repressing his 
“lower part,” the white man projects it on the black man and charges him for 
being what he refuses to be. And the body is the very symbol of this damned 
part. As in Judith Butler’s reading of the Hegelian dialectic, the white master 
demands the black slave to be his body, the very body he is frightened of.8 In 
that sense, anti-corporeality (as splitting) is, at least initially, the position of 
the master, not that of the slave. What Fanon demonstrates in a kind of 
Foucauldian manner is that the body is always-already integrated in a 
political field, that it is always a body politic. 
 Going further in Fanon’s conception of the body means discovering 
that it is fundamentally a conception of the “corps à corps,” a notion that he 
uses many times (and that is not really translatable in English). Actually, 
Fanon does not thematize the body, but the bodies; for him, the body only 
exists in relation with another body, in confrontation with other bodies. 
Therefore, what is to be thought at first is the “corps à corps” that opposes 
the black slave to the white master. That is what he will demonstrate 
magnificently in The Wretched of the Earth. Indeed, his theory of violence can 
be interpreted as a recentering of the (violent) “bodies struggle” in the 
master/slave dialectic, a stage that is almost always presupposed in theories 
of emancipation, but that is very rarely described as such. And the struggle 
for national liberation will be a process of re-embodiment putting an end to 
the colonial splitting as body dismemberment. 
 Fanon’s “corps à corps” has a crucial double meaning. To be sure, it 
means violence and suffering, but it also means love and pleasure. In Black 
Skin, White Masks, he comes back to the early romantic Hegel and gives rise to 
a dialectic of love that equates the figures of master and slave with those of the 
lovers – hence the crucial role played by the two chapters dedicated to 
“interracial love” in the colonial situation. And there is undeniably an erotic 
dimension in this sentence of the last chapter of the book: “I can already see 
a white man and a black man hand in hand.”9 Apparently inspired by the 
personalist philosopher Jean Lacroix, Fanon conceives of the reciprocal 
recognition of the white and black men as love gift and counter-gift (“don” et 
“contre-don”).10 However, in the colonial situation, such dialectic is rendered 
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impossible; “true love” cannot be attained, first and foremost because of the 
sexual pathologies that undermine any encounter between the white and 
black men/women, or colonizer and colonized. Again, for Fanon, these 
pathologies take their roots in the (European) civilization process. Indeed, in 
projecting his damned sexual part on the black other, the white man makes 
of him a pure biological being. By metonymy, the black man is a penis.11 
And in all his writings, Fanon reveals the replacement of the dialectical 
process by the antidialectical circle of sadism and masochism, which testifies of 
an unflagging entanglement of sexuality and violence. In the colonial 
situation, sexual perversions are the perpetual negation of human 
recognition.  
 But Fanon’s theoretical innovation does not rely so much on these 
arguments as such as on the answer he gives to the oversexualization of 
racialized people. Indeed, contrary to many others intellectuals, he refuses to 
simply use a method of negation or banishment that would consist in 
proving the non-objectivity or the irrationality of such sexual 
arguments/stereotypes, because such a strategy of desexualisation would 
threaten to establish the sick European sexuality as a norm and a goal to 
achieve. What is needed is not a desexualization but much more a 
decolonization of sexuality. In that sense, in Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon 
gives rise to a strategic romantic primitivism, which aims first and foremost to 
silence the European discourse on the non-European, especially by taking 
the sexual difference of the so-called “civilized” and “primitive” to 
(irreconciliable) extremes, in other words, by opposing in a sort of parodic 
Rousseauian way the “sexual sanity” of the African to the “pathological 
sexuality” of the European. However the danger of such arguments is that 
they remain embedded in a European matrix and threaten to merely repeat a 
form of Western nostalgia for the primitive. 
 I would like to argue now that Fanon’s actual move towards a theory 
of sexual decolonization, or better erotic decolonization, is made in The 
Wretched of the Earth. This assertion could seem strange. In fact, compared to 
the psychoanalytical language used in Black Skin, White Masks, the 
political/revolutionary language that prevails in Fanon’s last work seems 
“indifferent” to sexual matters. However, such a division between the “first” 
and the “last” Fanon must be challenged and I would like to show that 
Fanon’s theory of violence is at the same time an erotics of liberation. The 
Martinican psychiatrist adopts an economic point of view on violence, not in 
the sense of Marx and Engels, but rather in the sense of Freud. Violence is 
conceived by Fanon as an energy that circulates between the bodies politic 
that inhabit the colonial field, following some laws of accumulation, 
distribution, displacement, etc. The colonial violence is retained or charged 
in the body of the colonized, provoking a muscular tension that, beyond a 
certain threshold, must be discharged. In the colonial situation, it is 
unloaded through unproductive or even destructive endogenous violence, 
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return of myths and ecstatic dances. Conversely, the struggle for national 
liberation begins with the redirection of violence against its origin, against 
the colonizer. In this confrontation of violence and counter-violence, the 
energies should cancel each other out, giving rise to the vanishing of any 
violence. In that sense, Hardt and Negri are right in their last book, 
Commonwealth, when they speak of Fanon’s thermodynamic system of 
violence.12 We could even argue that Fanon’s theory of violence is a 
subversive repetition of Hobbes mechanics of (violent) bodies displayed in 
the Leviathan and that especially characterizes the state of nature – 
subversive because Fanon conceives of the state of nature not as a “prehistory” 
of politics, but inversely as the very effect of the colonial politics. 
 Let us recall now that for the psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich, whose 
writings Fanon knew quite well, sexual excitation is the archetype of a “good” 
muscular tension as concentration of energies and prelude to action – 
opposed to the “bad” tension which is nothing but a blocking of energies by 
the character/muscular armor.13 And Freud had thematized the intimate 
relation in childhood between “bodies struggle” and the birth of sexual 
excitation.14 Yet, for Fanon, the muscular tension is also an erotic tension, the 
colonized’s hypersensivity is also a form sensuality. Fanon speaks of libido 
works, of an overexcited affectivity (in French erection) that “takes an erotic 
delight in the muscular deflation of the crisis.”15 What is discharged is not 
only aggressive energies but also accumulated libido. Counter-violence is also 
a counter-libido. The violent bodies’ struggle is also an erotic struggle that 
recalls the colonial conquest stage which was, Fanon argues, a “freedom 
given to the sadism of the conqueror, to his eroticism.”16 As the Algerian 
writer Assia Djebar argues, there is “love of and in war.”17 In the anticolonial 
struggle, Fanon unveils a totally new and now productive entanglement of 
aggressive and sexual drives.  
 And he proceeds with his reflections on the dialectic of liberation as a 
dialectic of love. But now, the final goal is no longer the reconciliation of the 
colonizer and the colonized. On the contrary, re-making love means 
withdrawing any love for the colonizer. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon 
definitely abandons any Hegelian theory of mutual recognition. Love 
energies must be retained in the (de)colonized community and Fanon 
provides the better example of such a new love in A Dying Colonialism by 
thematizing the new revolutionary couple formed in the very struggle. This 
couple challenges the romantic/domestic European couple by being a 
struggle couple, by “becoming a link in the revolutionary organization,” but 
without sacrificing true love. 
 I would like to conclude with two related remarks. Firstly, it is crucial 
to recognize that both Fanon’s theories violence and love are embedded in 
what I would like to call a political philosophy of life that takes it roots both in a 
critics of the Hegelian and existential philosophies of death and in the 
tradition of medical vitalism. Let us recall that the two notions of “vie” (life) 
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and violence refers to the same Latin radical vis. As regards libido, its 
relation with “vital forces” does not have to be reminded. Such a political 
vitalism could be considered as a very subtle subversion or displacement of 
biological racial conception of struggle for life. Finally, one can wonder what 
would be, in Fanon’s view, the future of love after independence. How to 
disentangle violence and love? Fanon knows that the anticolonial counter-
violence is at the same time detoxifying/purifying and 
traumatic/destructive. He knows that the end of the war does not mean the 
end of violence. If decolonized forces of life emerged only through killing the 
enemy, is not the postcolonial biopolitic condemned to be, in Achille 
Mbembe’s words, a necropolitics?18 Is not love condemned to be still 
corrupted by hate and resentment? How to invent “true love” in the 
postcolonial moment?  
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